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THE FUTURE OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: 
A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT L. HEILBRONER'S 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 
ROBERT E. DEWEY 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
In his recent book,An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Robert 
L. Heilbroner argues that the current use of scientific technology by 
the industrialized nations is so rapidly exhausting the world's resources 
that free and democratic institutions must give way to authoritarian 
regimes with the power to control economic production, population 
size, and the expression of ideas, or mankind will perish. While ac-
knowledging the seriousness of the problems noted by Heilbroner, I 
contend that free and democratic institutions can, and probably will, 
provide solutions. To support this contention, I note that Heilbroner's 
pessimism about our institutions is based upon a conception of human 
nature akin to that held by Thomas Hobbes. Like Hobbes, Heilbroner 
believes that human nature is such that authoritarian solutions are 
necessary, especially when men face problems of scarcity. By arguing 
that such a view of human nature is false, the grounds for Heilbroner's 
pessimism with respect to the future of free and democratic institutions 
is removed. 
t t t 
Heilbroner (1974) has touched upon problems and 
fears which many of us have felt but not verbalized. So suc-
cessfully has he stated some of the central issues which must 
concern anyone who cares about the future of mankind and 
his institutions that his book has achieved a quite unexpected 
popularity, selling 80,000 copies within a few months of its 
publication. 
What does Heilbroner tell us which provokes such wide-
spread interest? Without wishful thinking, he calls attention 
in Chapter Two to three problems with a high potential for 
human tragedy. 
First, there is the continued growth of the world's 
population-a growth which realistically may be expected to 
continue at an alarming pace, despite well-intentioned but 
largely impractical efforts to introduce effective birth~ontrol 
programs. 
Second, the prospects are excellent that nation-states 
will continue to seek a solution of their conflicts with one 
another through war. According to Heilbroner, such wars 
may be limited to two or more nations engaged in a relatively 
local conflict. For example, few of us would be surprised to 
learn over the next fifty years that war between Israel and her 
Arab neighbors occurred periodically. We would not be sur-
prised at similar news about the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus 
or about the peoples of North and South Vietnam. Given the 
deeply-entrenched attitudes of hostility between peoples 
living near to one another throughout the world, the list of 
limited wars which are likely to occur is a discouragingly 
long one. Even worse, there is a considerable probability that 
we shall have major wars exceeding the destructiveness of 
anything mankind has yet witnessed. It is almost certain that 
nuclear weapons will be possessed within a few years not only 
by the major powers but also by some of the important under-
developed nations. During the period when only the major 
powers have nuclear weapons, there is sufficient cause for 
pessimism when one considers the possibilities of co~flict 
present in the varying relationships among Russia, China, and 
the United States. When the under-developed nations have 
nuclear weaponry, however, Heilbroner observes that for the 
first time we may experience "wars of redistribution" in which 
the poor nations attack the rich in an effort to gain a larger 
share of the world's wealth (1974:43). 
While the two problems of population growth and war 
are sufficient to make the human prospect gloomy, there is 
yet a third danger which promises to be even more important 
in shaping the future of mankind. This danger arises from the 
fact that the current use of scientific technology by the in-
dustrialized nations is so rapidly exhausting the world's re-
sources that man's ability to survive will be in jeopardy. The 
problem here has many aspects. We are using up the mater-
ials needed to produce goods; we are exhausting our energy 
resources; and we are polluting the means of sustaining life: 
our land, our water, and our air. To take but one illustration, 
Heilbroner cites figures to show that if we continue the pre-
sent pace of heat-producing activities, we shall so increase 
the earth's temperature within 250 years that the earth will 
no longer be suitable for human habitation (1974:51). 
Happily, Heilbroner does not predict that the history 
of mankind has its end in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, 
he does conclude that the ''threats of runaway populations, 
obliterative war, and potential environmental collapse, can be 
seen as an extended and growing crisis induced by the advent 
of a command over natural processes and forces that far ex-
ceeds the reach of our present mechanisms of social control" 
(1974:57). 
Heilbroner then turns to the question of whether our 
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present socio-economic systems have the adaptive capacity to 
meet the crises so clearly coming upon us. He observes that 
there are two major socio-economic systems which influence 
human behavior in our time: capitalism and socialism (1974: 
63). Discussing capitalism first, Heilbroner notes that the 
demands of survival require that economic growth cease or 
be drastically reduced. When fewer material goods become 
available, capitalist societies will experience internal crises as 
their members struggle with one another for what they regard 
as their proper share of the goods available. According to 
Heilbroner: 
The struggle for relative position would not 
only pit one class against another, but also each 
against all, as lower and middle groups engaged in 
a free-for-all for higher incomes. This would bring 
enormous inflationary pressures of the kind that 
capitalism is already beginning to experience, and 
would require the imposition of much stronger 
control measures than any that capitalism has yet 
succeeded in introducing-indeed, than any that 
capitalist governments have yet imagined. 
In bluntest terms, the question is whether 
the Hobbesian struggle that is likely to arise in 
such a strait-jacketed economic society would not 
impose intolerable strains on the representative 
democratic political apparatus that has been 
historically associated with capitalist societies. 
(1974:88-89). 
On the next page, Heilbroner then answers his own blunt 
question by saying that most capitalist nations will find that 
the task exceeds the capabilities of representative democracy. 
In similar fashion, he tells us that democratically-governed, 
socialist nations will face the same kind of internal crisis and 
will also be forced to authoritarian political systems (1974: 
92). As a further consequence of the move to authoritarian 
regimes, Heilbroner envisions a time when our present free-
doms of expression shall give way to a demand from our 
leaders for a quasi-military devotion and sacrifice which 
brooks no disagreement with the official line (1974:26,110). 
In sum, the human prospect for Heilbroner is one in 
. which mankind will survive at a considerably lower standard 
of living than is now enjoyed by most persons in the advanced 
industrial nations. To achieve that survival, free and demo-
cratic institutions will give way to authoritarian political 
systems with the power to control economic activity, popula-
tion size, and the expression of ideas. 
If we reflect now upon this prospect, can anything be 
said to alleviate the bleakness? We can dream that our scien-
tists will be so inventive in the next 100 years that ways will 
be found of increasing economic productivity, of feeding a 
continuously expanding population, and of ceasing to pol-
lute the environment. But we must admit that we should only 
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be dreaming. At present, there are no realistic possibilities 
of the coming of a scientific Savior. Accordingly, I think we 
must agree with Heilbroner that we face a declining standard 
of living and a greater measure of social control with respect 
to economic production and population size. 
At the same time, I cannot agree that the type of social 
control required involves the loss of the free and democratic 
institutions we now possess. Let us return to that portion of 
Heilbroner's argument where he foresees he demise of repre-
sentative democracy and examine it again. He tells us that 
when goods become more scarce, we shall have a struggle of 
"one class against another" and "each against all" (1974: 
89). Such a struggle will impose an intolerable strain on 
representative democracy and will be brought to an end only 
when authoritarian institutions come into being with suffi-
cient power to enforce whatever decrees are necessary. 
Heilbroner's reasoning is strikingly reminiscent of 
Thomas Hobbes' famous description of the natural condition 
of mankind in Chapter 13 of the Leviathan (originally pub-
lished in 1651). There, Hobbes says: " ... during the time men 
live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they 
are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, 
as is of every man, against every man" (1929 :96). Moreover, 
in such condition, one finds "the life of man, solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short" (1929 :97). Hobbes goes on to argue 
that if rational men were in such a state of nature, they would 
recognize that the only way to establish the common power 
needed for security is for each person to give up his right of 
governing himself to an absolute Sovereign (1929 :131-132)-
a Sovereign empowered, among other things, to censor the 
expression of any opinion endangering the peace of the 
commonwealth (1929 :136-137). If one then asks why Hobbes 
believed such a complete surrender of self-governance to be 
necessary, he finds the answer in Hobbes' conception of 
human nature. For Hobbes, men will by nature quarrel with 
one another unless they have such a common power "to keep 
them all in awe" (1929 :96). 
Fortunately, we have ample evidence from history to 
know that Hobbes was wrong. Men can, and have, lived 
peacefully with one another without the complete surrender 
of those rights thought necessary by him. We also have ample 
evidence from psychology and the social sciences to know that 
Hobbes was wrong. Men are, in large part, the products of 
their social upbringing. On the one hand, if a society teaches 
its members to quarrel and to reach for their guns when it is 
time to divide the economic assets, they will do so. Then, 
peace can be restored only by a power sufficiently immense 
to keep them all in awe. On the other hand, if a society 
teaches its members to press their economic demands by the 
use of democratic procedures and to accept the lawful poli-
cies thereby enacted, there may be strain, frustration, riots, 
but it is not likely that there will be revolution. 
So far as I can see, Heilbroner's pessimism with respect 
to the future of free and democratic institutions assumes an 
estimate of human motivation akin to that held by Hobbes. 
Moreover, just as the testimony of history and of the sciences 
has already refuted the Hobbesian view, so also does this 
same evidence provide good reason for thinking that people, 
trained by long habit in the use of free and democratic insti-
tutions, will meet the economic crises to come. This being so, 
there is more hope in the human prospect than Heilbroner 
would lead us to believe. 
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